3 particular location, or competitive behaviour between rival nations/cities. 3 The second section reviews the, largely descriptive, literature on bidding for sports events. The third section reports the history of mega-event bidding and some case studies from the State of South Australia, emphasising dynamic elements such as learning and the creation of vested interests which influence future bidding behaviour. The theoretical model and the empirical analysis suggest that understanding of the bidding process requires a political economy (public choice) approach, and that large gaps remain in our understanding of the political process under which bids are made. In the conclusions we discuss the role of transparency and issues such as the role of public beliefs as to benefits and costs of proposed events.
The Model
To illustrate the potential role of lobbying in the sports bidding process, we present a model based on the common-agency framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994) in order to explain the size of a bid (B) . We assume that there are three groups in society: a single lobby group which benefits from the bidding process, the public, and the government. 4 The ex ante estimates of the returns from hosting the event (R) are accepted as true by all parties in the model.
The lobby group makes political contributions (S(B)) to the government, which are contingent on the level of the bid made (S>0, S<0). The group is a direct beneficiary from the bidding process. Benefits could include profits derived from marketing activities, prehosting construction (as part of a bid), benefits to a particular sporting association, etc. In other words, we wish to keep the notion of a third party which yields some private benefit from bidding for mega-events as broad as possible. In addition, should the event be won, it is logical to assume that the lobby would also gain some additional benefit. Denote the returns extracted by the lobby from the bidding process as (B), with >0, <0, where
The first term captures the direct benefits from the bid and the second the share of the estimated gains which accrue from hosting an event. The 3 For some mega-events a preliminary competition determines which city will be the national bidder, while for other events cities bid directly in a single stage. When governments make the case for a bid, there tends to be little discussion of rival behaviour. Moreover, nations with seemingly little chance of success often bid against more likely candidates, e.g. the bids to host the 2018 Football World Cup by Indonesia and by Qatar in 2022, where playing temperatures are likely to exceed 40 degrees. 4 We ignore competition between rival lobby groups. The specification here implicitly assumes that there is one lobbying citizen and one public person. This assumption is made for simplicity without changing the intuition behind the results which follow.
4
parameter  captures the proportion of this benefit which, in the event of a successful bid, falls to the general public (
 
0,1
 
).
The public are assumed to bear the full cost of any bidding (B) which takes place.
The probability of winning the event is denoted (B,), where (B)>0, (B)<0, (B=0)=0, ()>0, ()<0, (0,1). A larger bid increases the probability of success, but with diminishing marginal returns. 5 The probability of success also turns on the exogenous parameter  which captures characteristics of the potential host at the time of bidding. 6 The utility of the lobby and the public can thus be expressed as: Where (0,1) is the proportion of exogenous returns to hosting the event captured by the public. The costs associated with the bid (B) are fully borne by the public, which assumes that the contribution of the lobby group to the cost of the bid is zero.
The government"s utility is a weighted sum of contributions received from the lobby group and aggregate welfare (W) associated with the bid.
   
Consistent with Grossman and Helpman (1994) , we assume that the relative weight (θ) ascribed to aggregate welfare vis à vis contributions is determined exogenously. Aggregate welfare is the sum of all agents' utility. Contributions made by the lobby group are received by government and cancel out in aggregate. Hence, aggregate welfare is specified as:
Equilibrium Conditions
The lobby group makes contributions which are contingent on the level of B chosen. With both this and aggregate welfare in mind, the government chooses B. The conditions for an 5 Note, however, that if the potential host does not make a bid, it has no chance of success. Put differently, it is evident that hosting rights are not awarded on the basis of  alone. Obviously, there is a likely interaction between attributes and the bid which is discussed below. 6 Such characteristics might include, political stability, enforcement of law and order, location and attractiveness to fans. Examples are Brazil's status in soccer (a high  for its 2014 World Cup bid) and hooliganism (reducing  for England's 2018 World Cup bid) While some of these factors change over time, we consider them fixed at the point in time in which a bid is made. 5 equilibrium of this type of menu-auction game are set down in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) :
(BW1) indicates that the equilibrium bid (B) is chosen to maximise a weighted sum of contributions from the lobby group and aggregate welfare, while condition (BW2) requires that joint welfare of the lobby and the government is maximised. From equations (1) and (3):
and BW2: 0
Hence,
Equations (4a-4c) imply that around the equilibrium point, contributions will be offered such that the marginal cost of changing policy is equated to the marginal benefit of such a change.
Such contributions are coined by Grossman and Helpman as "locally truthful".
The Government's Decision on the Size of the Bid
By substituting (4c) into the right hand side of the government"s first order condition in (4a), it is evident that the equilibrium bid will be chosen to satisfy:
Using (1) and (3), the associated first order condition is:
Totally differentiating (5) and performing the relevant calculations yields the following results:
The size of the bid will increase with the estimated returns (R) from holding an event.
While the uncertainty of the estimate of R is not modelled here, the result highlights the importance of ex ante versus ex post estimates of benefit. A well known result from the sports economics literature is that the gains realised after an event is held are often found to be well short of initial estimates. This provides a potential feedback insofar as potential beneficiaries from a bid have an incentive to promote a high ex ante estimate of R.
While government is willing to spend more on the bid when these gains are high, the effect is tempered by a high value for . In R1 the term
 is unambiguously positive and decreasing in the parameter . Hence, if the gains from winning the event fall less to the lobby, the government response to an increase in estimated benefits will be more muted.
Direct support for this result is provided in R2, in which the level of the bid falls with the parameter . Again, a lower share of the spoils for the lobby, which as shown receives a higher weight than the general public in government decision making, implies the government is less willing to spend on a bid. The signs of (R3) and (R4) are dependent on the values of certain parameters and assumptions in the model. If the marginal effect of bids rises with attributes, then the sign of R3 is positive. Intuitively, as exogenous attributes become more favourable, this increases the effectiveness of bidding, and the effect is greater when R is large. Conversely, if bid spending and attributes are substitutes, then the sign of R3 is negative. The sign of (R4) depends on the gains relative to the costs of bidding. Where 7 the gains are large, an increase in regard for aggregate welfare will lead to a higher bid. 8 If costs are high, an increase with regard to public welfare leads to a lower bid.
Contributions from the Lobby Group
The lobby group chooses contributions to maximise its utility in (1). The first order condition is:
In equilibrium, the lobby will chose contributions to equate the marginal cost of a political donation with the marginal expected gains it receives from both the bidding process and its share of the hosting benefits. 9 Totally differentiating (6) and evaluating yields:
Result R5 indicates that equilibrium contributions to the government will tend to be lower when the share of hosting benefits which accrue to the public (instead of the lobby) are high. Intuitively, when the benefits which accrue to the lobby from winning the right to host are small, the marginal benefits of lobbying for a bid are eroded. The sign of R6 depends on the effect attributes have on the marginal product of bidding. Where attributes strengthen the 8 However, note that the gains could be toward either the lobby or the public, with the effect holding even if the latter group receives little. One possibility is that 1. B    Evidence suggests that bids are often partially spent on travel for overseas delegates, etc. However, note that even with such an assumption, the stronger the effect of a bid on the lobby group"s profits, ceteris paribus the exogenous gains (R) can be lower. 9 With monetary contributions the marginal cost of a political contribution is equal to unity. 10 All proofs appear in the Appendix. 8 effect of bids on winning hosting rights, the lobby is more prepared to make contributions.
Intuitively, as the chances of success are greater due to the exogenous characteristics, it is more worthwhile to lobby for a bid to be made. Result R7 reveals that higher estimated gains (R) will induce greater lobbying effort to induce the government to bid more. This arises due to two factors. First, the government will suffer a lower political loss when R is high (aggregate welfare will be expected to increase in the event that a bid is successful), and hence less contributions are required to influence the government. Second, as the lobby is a direct beneficiary to these estimated returns, it has a stronger incentive to lobby for a bid to be made.
Note that the magnitudes of expressions (R6) and (R7) fall when the proportion of the estimated benefits which will accrue to the public is higher. In the limit, where =1,
Such a case does not imply that no lobbying for a bid takes place, however in the limiting case contributions will turn only on the direct effect on the lobby"s profits through .
If all of the gains from actually hosting the event fall to the general public, the lobby group will not have a regard for the chances of success arising from the bid itself; the sole gain to the lobby is from its participation in the bidding process.
Discussion
Taken together, the results indicate that lobbying efforts and bidding will be unambiguously higher where the estimated gains (R), the proportion of the gains accruing to special interests(1-), or the direct benefits accruing to the lobby from the bid ( B   ) are greater. This is unsurprising given that each raises the potential benefits for the lobby group and hence induces it to make contributions. Such contributions are only made contingent on the government making a higher bid. However, the results bring several issues relating to megaevent bidding into new light.
First, and perhaps most pronounced, is the effect of estimated gains from holding the event. We assume that the estimate of gains is taken as given, but it has been well documented that ex post estimations of benefits from events such as the Olympics tend to be much lower than a priori ones. This is a problem which is now gaining increased recognition in the media, however, what has been largely ignored is that overstated benefits may have the effect of increasing both the quantity and efficacy of special interest group lobbying. We also note that, although not modelled here, special interest groups tend to strongly advocate the 9 "large" gains which are likely to accrue from hosting mega-events. This type of lobbying of the public acts as a complement to its direct lobbying of the government. Similarly, governments may also have an incentive to overstate estimated public benefits in order to lower the political costs of catering to lobbying demands (and perpetuating the payment of political contributions).
Our results suggest that interactions between lobby groups and government can lead to a bid which is not in the public interest. Bidding will be greater where the direct gains to lobby groups from the process itself are higher and when the lobby group receives a larger share of the benefits from actually hosting the event. The diversion of tax revenue to lobby groups (i.e. the direct gains) and the accrual to those groups of a larger share of the benefits from a successful bid may be in politicians' interests rather than the interests of the public, and both government and the lobby group may prefer to obfuscate how B and R are distributed.
As will be shown below, information relating to how bids are spent is often not readily available to the public. The results bring into question the role of the decision making process of the governing bodies making decisions over hosting rights. At very least, a strengthening of public disclosure rules about how bid money is spent appears to be warranted. Moreover, both groups may have a strong incentive to overstate the gains associated with hosting an event. Hence, public information which reveals the manner in which bids are spent has the capacity to increase public awareness as to potential beneficiaries from the process (which might limit the credibility of these groups' claims as to public benefits) and make governments more accountable for the sums they spend on bidding.
Literature
Many sporting events have a natural monopoly element due to the quest to know the true champion. In many sports this was driven initially by an amateur spirit, embodied in the Olympic Games or in Wimbledon in tennis, where professionals were not allowed to compete. Gradually such mega-events became professionalized and commercialized. This section reviews the background in the context of bidding to host mega-events. For the Olympic Games, 1986 marked a dividing line when competitive bidding and emphasis on commercial success became more pronounced. The 1990s saw increasing belief in the economic, as opposed to more narrowly sporting, benefits of hosting mega-events, which and another ten were sanctioned -the first expulsion or sanction for corruption in IOC history. Stricter rules about acceptance of gifts and ceilings on how much IOC members could accept from bid cities were put in place for future bids.
11 There is a large literature, much of it non-rigorous consultancy reports, on the anatomy of a successful bid in terms of marketing, bid-team composition and so forth, captured in Westerbeek et al. (2002) and reviewed in the South African context by Swart and Bob (2004) (1975, 1979 and 1983) and the 1987 World Cup was jointly held in India and Pakistan, after which an unofficial rotation system was introduced.
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The rugby union World Cup, held every four years since 1987, has had a strict hemispherical rotation, although this is being challenged by Japan"s bid to host the 2015 event. the first international baseball tournament to include players from the major leagues, but there is no competition for hosting rights because matches are played in several countries worldwide, although both finals were held in the USA. 17 The level of private spending on stadium upgrading seems to be exceptional. For the 1974 WC in Germany all spending on stadiums was public and this seems to be the model for South Africa in 2010. An extensive literature suggests that, on balance, spending on stadiums yields a low social return (Wilson and Pomfret, 2009 With the growing economic importance of sports and broader TV coverage, many minor spectator sports (e.g. equestrian events) or minor events of major sports (e.g. rugby sevens) have become sought after by host cities or countries. The case study in the next section, Adelaide, a city of about a million people, illustrates this development. Adelaide hosted the Australian F1 Grand Prix for ten years from its inaugural year 1985, but then lost the event to Melbourne, reflecting the difficulty of competing with larger cities for true megaevents. Adelaide has successfully bid to be a sub-host of a true mega-event (the 2000 Olympics) and has unsuccessfully bid for a second-tier event (the Commonwealth Games), but it has been most active in bidding for a wide range of sporting events below this level.
The state and city governments have dedicated offices for event attraction and management and substantial, but non-transparent, public funding has gone into bidding for events.
22 20 The strength of tradition is illustrated by the survival of Green Bay Packers despite other NFL owners' dissatisfaction with the existence of a small-town quasi publicly owned club in their league. When 20 leading clubs seceded from the Football League to form the FA Premier League, they were unable to drop the principle of promotion and relegation (which permitted small town teams to reach the PL while some big cities were unrepresented) and the structure of soccer in England and Wales remained unchanged (although the distribution of TV revenues did not). 21 The 1950 F1 world championship consisted of eight GPs in Europe and one in the USA. Since then the number has doubled, and events in Europe and the Americas have been dropped in favour of races in Asia and the Middle East -of the eighteen races in 2008, nine were held outside Europe. 22 State budgets have a single line item for winning and managing major events, which include musical festivals, food events, a rose festival, the Christmas pageant and other non-sporting events. Funding for many events is through the budget of the South Australian Tourism Commission (SATC). Adelaide city council covers a small 15
Adelaide
South Australia and its capital city Adelaide have hosted a large number of events in recent decades, including a wide range of sporting events. However, several of the more notable bidding episodes were unsuccessful, notably failure to win the 1998 and 2006
Commonwealth Games and loss of the Australian F1 Grand Prix in 1995/6. The state and city governments did not renounce sporting events, but adopted a range of strategies in order to be a host city.
Efforts of the State to host the Commonwealth (previously Empire) Games date back to the mid 1950"s, when Adelaide was the favourite to host the 1962 games, only to lose out to Perth. Subsequent bids for the 1998 and 2006 games were also unsuccessful. In all of these cases, the bidding process was a two stage one, with cities bidding at the national level before proceeding as the "Australian representative" against overseas competitors.
The 1992 bid to host the 1998 Games was in the competitive post-LA-Olympics era, and both Adelaide and Kuala Lumpur lobbied hard for hosting rights. Adelaide reportedly spent A$600,000 to be the representative bidder from Australia and a further A$4 million on the campaign, and had lined up an A$25 million government subsidy for the event itself.
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Official records from the South Australian Department of Recreation and Sport reveal that a total of $A4.1 million was allocated to the 1998 bid, exclusive of the sum spent on winning the stage one bid. 24 However, these figures only include salaries, administrative expenses, equipment, sundries, accommodation and service costs for the bidding office. It seems likely that this excludes other consultancy fees (e.g. to marketing and transport companies). In addition, at the beginning of the process, Cabinet approved the construction of a velodrome contingent on winning the right to be the Australian representative bidder for the 1998 games;
while this facility has been used for other events, the Commonwealth Games bid is part of the metropolitan area, and other councils fund events in their jurisdiction (e.g. Adelaide has never bid to host the Olympics, but it hosted seven soccer matches in the Sydney Olympics. For these games, the Hindmarsh Stadium was upgraded to increase capacity and improve facilities at a cost to state taxpayers of $24.5 million, an expenditure that was well over-budget and criticised in a subsequent official report (Wilson and Pomfret, 2009) . Adelaide is expecting to be a host city in the case of a successful Australian bid to host the 2018 or 2022 soccer World Cup, and the debate about public stadium funding is once again hotting up.
Adelaide"s major mega-event coup was in obtaining the right to host the Australian million in in-kind support and security costs of $79.1 million. The SA government seemed to pay little attention to the Games" profitability; an assurance was made that should additional revenue be realised from TV rights or marketing, then these funds would be channelled back into the development of Commonwealth Games sports in Australia. 29 http://www.gov.ns.ca/news/details.asp?id=20061130006 The transparency of the provincial government website contrasts starkly with the secrecy surrounding SA expenditures. 30 Michael Schumacher collided with rival Damon Hill to win the F1 championship. 31 A controversy arose between Don Panoz, the owner of the Le Mans series and the SA government over when during the year to best hold the race after the initial staging. At that time it was also contemplated to combine the Le Mans series with the Clipsal 500 race to host a Motor Sport Festival over up to 9 days. The Auditor The "path dependence" in terms of Adelaide"s reaction to the loss of the F1 Grand Prix was mirrored after the loss of the 1998 Commonwealth Games bid. In particular, the there is a tendency to fall back to lesser events after a major event is lost or the bid for hosting is unsuccessful. In part, this could be a function of the arguments relating to the economic importance of sports events that are often touted at the time of bidding. Once lost, politicians have a propensity to find substitutes. In some cases, such as those outlined below, this may be a relatively successful strategy.
In 1997 The AI3DE is Australia's premier equestrian competition, the only CCI four star event held in the southern hemisphere and one of only six held across the world. 34 As with the Tour Down
Under, the strategy with the AI3DE was to build up an event reputation and then become a In sum, Adelaide has pursued a variety of strategies in bidding to host sports events. Melbourne"s α was larger than Adelaide"s, at least in the eyes of the owners of the F1 brand).
An alternative approach is to identify a sport in which the event-allocating body is less powerful (or has characteristics less adverse to Adelaide"s α) and build up an event that will be accredited in time, as with the TDU and the AI3DE. Finally Adelaide has focused on hosting niche international events such as the Police and Fire Games or trying to create its own attractions.
A problem in evaluating the alternative strategies and assessing the power of the model developed above is that the public accounts do not provide information on how much was spent on specific events. Regardless of the availability of data, there is a case for a more thorough examination of the justification behind attempting to host or hosting on a perpetual basis these events. Ex post studies show few gains, and in some cases (such as the Le Mans race) large losses.
Given that success in bidding is uncertain, the desirability of directing public money to such a purpose is questionable. Our model and the observations from South Australia"s bidding history raise questions about both the bid-making process when public money is involved, and in particular the decision-making processes of the government.
Conclusions
The issue of bidding for sports mega-events has been neglected in the literature, where the focus has been on comparisons between the ex ante purported economic benefits against This paper examines one important aspect of the bidding process, namely the role of special interest groups. Our lobbying model reveals that lobby groups may be able to extract rents from the bidding process at the expense of general welfare of the public, and actively induce the government to make bids. This application to sport builds upon an impressive literature which demonstrates that special interests may sway policy outcomes in their favour, even when the general welfare effects are negative (see for example, Stigler, 1971; Grossman and Helpman, 1994) .
There is little doubt that some interest groups benefit from bidding for a major event whether the bid is successful or not, e.g. bidding expenditures often are heavily weighted towards marketing and benefit consulting firms or publicity agencies. Moreover, it is likely 22 that during the bidding process, the relevant sporting bodies at a regional or national level will receive government funding, which may cross-subsidize their normal activities. hosting mega-events, that the event "will put the city on the map". Gratton et al (2006) argue that the economic perspective is too narrow a view of impact and recommend a "balanced scorecard" approach with four elements: economic impact, sports development, media and sponsor evaluation, and place marketing effects. Politicians (both incumbent and opposition) and in particular sporting associations and other groups standing to gain a significant benefit tend to adopt a high public profile in touting these less easily quantifiable arguments. This "lobbying of the public" has been an under-researched area of public choice economics, and, given its prevalence in the context of sports policy, warrants further investigation. 36 South
Australia is a prime example; e.g. in announcing Adelaide's bid for the 2006 Commonwealth Games, the Government cited market research making the following claim:
"I have been pleasantly surprised at the community support. Some 84% of the community supported the bid, but the best part of it is that 86% of people between the ages of 18 and 25 not only supported the bid, but believed that the Government should make a significant investment in obtaining the opportunity" (The Hon G. A. Ingerson, Parliamentary Debates SA 1994 /95, page 1771 .
Such a claim, despite obvious questions as to whether the true opportunity costs were revealed to respondents, is typical of the rhetoric of various public organisations proposing bids. One possibility is that by fostering such favourable perceptions early in the process, there may be less scrutiny of government spending by the public. Moreove, by directing 36 Yu (2005) is one notable exception attention to non-quantifiable benefits this process pre-empts criticism about over-stating the net public benefits of a successful bid.. More generally, this may be part of a pattern of obfuscation by which government and lobby groups hide the true costs and benefits of a bid which benefits these groups disproportionately and may potentially leave the tax-paying public with net costs.
Compounding the issue is that special interest groups which stand to gain from the bidding process itself or from winning the right to host are often not immediately observable by the public (at least before the event). The case study of Adelaide is suggestive of path dependence in terms of hosting major events. The loss of an event may indeed see a scramble to find substitutes. At the same time the establishment of major event committees
or rewarding bodies such as SATC for winning major events creates vested interests which will lobby for future events in order to maintain their status.
While we have noted that South Australia has been a "serial bidder" for mega (and not so mega) events, we do not present this case study as something out of the ordinary. Indeed, we suspect that many readers of this paper will recognize some elements familiar in the context of their own countries. The discussion has raised several questions relating to both the process itself and the public choice aspects of sports bidding, which we believe are applicable not just to sports mega-events, but also to other community events such as arts or food festivals and also to public policy decisions about subsidies for location of industries or about awarding of defence contracts. 
Contributions
The FOC in (6) 
